Tan Sri Dato' Lim Cheng Pow v Bellajade Sdn Bhd and another appeal

FEDERAL COURT (PUTRAJAYA) — CIVIL APPEAL NOS 02(f)-135–11 OF 2017 (W) AND 02(f)-136–11 OF 2017 (W)
VERNON ONG, ABDUL RAHMAN SEBLI, ZABARIAH MOHD, HASNAH HASHIM AND RHODZARIAH BUJANG FCJJ
30 SEPTEMBER 2021

Land Law — Classification of land — Condition of land use — Application under s 204D of the National Land Code for surrender, re-alienation and change of express condition of land from 'residential' to 'commercial' and 'mixed development' was approved but change of express condition not endorsed in issue document of title — Parties entered into tenancy agreement of office building even though condition of use as stated in issue document of title was 'residential' — Whether approval by state authority given under s 204D of the National Land Code ('the NLC') operated as approval of land use under s 124 of the NLC — Whether change of condition of land under s 124 of the NLC took effect upon endorsement of the same on issue document of title — Whether tenancy for commercial use of land which was by condition for residential use was illegal and void — National Land Code ss 78(3), 113(a), 124 & 204D

Bellajade Sdn Bhd ('Bellajade') was the owner of an office building ('the building') which was built on nine parcels of land ('the lands'). Bellajade had entered into a tenancy agreement ('the agreement') with CME Group Bhd ('CME') in respect of the building for a period of three years whereby CME's performance of the agreement was guaranteed by Tan Sri Dato' Lim Cheng Pow ('Tan Sri Lim'). Problem arose when CME failed to pay rentals of the building which led to the filing of legal action by Bellajade. Against this claim, CME counterclaimed for rentals, rental deposit, and utilities bills which it had paid to Bellajade on the ground that the agreement was void as it was in contravention to the express condition of the lands. It ought to be noted that at the material time when the agreement was entered ie on 21 February 2013 as well as at the time when the dispute between the parties was filed in court, the category of use for the said lands endorsed in the issue document of title was 'Building' with 'Residential' as their express condition. Nevertheless, before the agreement was entered, on 8 May 2012, the application made under s 204D of the National Land Code ('the NLC') by the original owner of the lands, Kris Angsana Sdn Bhd ('Kris Angsana') for surrender, re-alienation and change of the express condition from 'Residential' to 'Commercial' and 'Mixed Development' ('the application under s 204D') was granted subject to payment of premium. Upon payment of the said premium, the Department of Land and Mines, Kuala Lumpur had issued a certificate dated 18 February

2013 acknowledging the payment of premium and stating that the application under s 204D had been approved. There was also a letter dated 5 September 2013 informing Kris Angsana about the decision dated 8 May 2012 as well as on the increase in premium. At the end of the trial, the learned judicial commissioner ('JC') found that the agreement was illegal on the basis that the contemplated use of the premises contravened the express condition. The JC therefore dismissed Bellajade's claim and allowed CME's counterclaim. On appeal, the JC's decision was reversed by the Court of Appeal ('the COA'). Aggrieved by the decision of the COA, CME and Tan Sri Lim filed separate appeals to the Federal Court ('the FC'). The FC by majority decision had allowed the appeals but the decision was delivered without the presence of one of the presiding judges, Justice Zulkefli bin Ahmad Makinuddin, who had retired. Upon the application by Bellajade for the review of the FC's decision pursuant to s 78 of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 on the ground of coram failure, the appeals were heard afresh by the FC. The questions of law to be determined by the court were: (a) whether an approval by the state authority given under s 204D of the NLC operated as an approval of land use under s 124 of the NLC ('the first question'); (b) whether a change of condition of land under s 124 of the NLC took effect upon endorsement of the same on the issue document of title to the land in question ('the second question'); and (c) whether a tenancy for commercial use of land which was by condition for residential use was illegal and void having regard to the decisions of the FC in *Singma Sawmill Co Sdn Bhd v Asian Holdings (Industrialised Buildings) Sdn Bhd* [1980] 1 MLJ 21 ('Singma's case') and *Toh Huat Khay v Lim A Chang (in his capacity as the executor of the estate of Toh Hoy Khay, deceased)* [2010] 4 MLJ 312 ('Toh Huat Khay's case) ('the third question'). In respect of the additional evidence in the form of letters from office of Director of Land and Mines, Federal Territory dated 16 November 2015 and 16 December 2015 ('the additional evidence') related to increase in premium that were filed in the Court of Appeal pursuant to s 69 of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964, Bellajade argued that this additional evidence was not material.

Held, allowing the appeals in part:

(1) Based on the land administrator's letter dated 5 September 2013, and the certificate confirming the approval, Kris Angsana's application was expressly stated to have been made under s 204D of the NLC and in the said certificate, the condition of the land titles was clearly stated to be mixed development for the purpose of apartments and office only. Therefore, the application was not made solely for a change of condition under s 124(4) of the NLC. Section 204D of the NLC was invoked because this development was not on a single parcel of land but nine parcels of land, hence the need for amalgamation of the lands and given the nature of the development, there was an equal need to make that application under s 124(4). The mere fact that s 204D of the NLC was

only stated in the alternative in the said certificate did not mean that it was not invoked by the land administrator because pursuant to s 204C of the NLC which set out the condition before an approval under s 204D was granted, a change in land use and by necessary implication, even its condition could be incorporated into that application. The court said 'implication' because both land use and its condition were covered by the same s 124 of the NLC and furthermore, s 113(a) on the change in condition referred to s 124(1). Based on the peculiar facts of this case, the court answered the first question in the positive because it was clear that Kris Angsana's application was made both under ss 204D and 124(4) of the NLC (see para 11).

(2) The court could not agree with the appellants that s 78(3) of the NLC which provided that alienation of land took effect upon registration of the register document of title applied in the present case because that provision was specifically for alienation. Since there was a specific provision governing the effective date for variation or changes in land use and its condition, which was s 124 of the NLC, then that should be the one which must be given effect to (see para 12).

(3) The NLC did not stipulate the effective date for the approval of the change in condition. In the absence of such specific provision, the effective date would be when the same was similarly endorsed on the title. This was because: (a) it was settled law that under the Torrens system, the register was 'everything' and therefore, the change of use of the land would only take effect upon its endorsement on the land title; and (b) the approval for change in condition was insufficient without the consequential mandatory requirements of s 124(7) being carried out. The court therefore answered the second question in the affirmative (see para 14).

(4) Based on the clear pronouncements made by the FC in *Singma*'s case and *Toh Huat Khay*'s case, the obvious answer to the third question was in the affirmative. However, answering the second question and the third question in the affirmative did not necessarily mean a complete legal victory for CME and Tan Sri Lim. This was because of the peculiarity of the facts before the court as unlike *Singma*'s case, there was no obvious intention to commit or even perpetuate the illegality in the present case. The imposition of further premium which were not yet settled should not be completely held against Bellajade because the crucial time here was the execution date of the agreement. With the approval and full satisfaction of the condition imposed to effect the change of land use, what was left to be done at that material time was the administrative act of endorsing the change on the land title. Thus, the agreement was not void ab initio. In the face of this finding, the question of knowledge of the alleged illegality of the said condition on the part of CME was immaterial

to the issue of its liability to pay the rentals as claimed (see paras 15–16).

(5) The argument on knowledge or rather lack thereof on the part of CME was validly made by the learned counsel especially the argument regarding non-pleading of constructive knowledge by Bellajade and in the face of the admission by Bellajade regarding the absence of knowledge. The said knowledge should not have been imputed on CME to fasten liability on their part and the evidence which stands in their favour was that it only found out about the express condition on the land use when it conducted a search on the land on 28 October 2013 as shown in the official documents of the Department of Land and Mines, Kuala Lumpur (see paras 17–19).

(6) The court could not agree with Bellajade's contention that the additional evidence was not material. The fact that it was clearly stated in the letter dated 16 December 2015 that the other decisions made on 8 May 2012 were maintained, that surely meant that the decision to increase the premium was also maintained. Therefore, with effect from 16 December 2015, the pre-requisite to effect the change in condition was not met based on the undisputed evidence that the increase in premium was not paid at the material time of this dispute. Thus, from the said date onwards, Bellajade could not presupposed that the said change in condition was still effective or in place and under the said circumstances, the agreement had by then, been rendered void. For the reason stated above, Bellajade was therefore, only entitled to claim the outstanding rentals from May 2013 until December 2015 but not until the end of the three years tenancy period as it prayed in the statement of claim (see paras 20 & 22–23).

[Bahasa Malaysia summary

Bellajade Sdn Bhd ('Bellajade') ialah pemilik sebuah bangunan pejabat ('bangunan tersebut') yang dibina di atas sembilan bidang tanah ('tanah tersebut'). Bellajade telah memeterai perjanjian penyewaan ('perjanjian tersebut') dengan CME Group Bhd ('CME') ke atas bangunan tersebut untuk tempoh tiga tahun di mana pelaksanaan perjanjian tersebut oleh CME dijamin oleh Tan Sri Dato' Lim Cheng Pow ('Tan Sri Lim'). Masalah timbul apabila CME gagal membayar sewa bangunan yang membawa kepada pemfailan tindakan undang-undang oleh Bellajade. CME memfailkan tuntutan balas terhadap tuntutan tersebut untuk sewa, deposit sewa dan bil utiliti yang telah dibayarnya kepada Bellajade atas alasan bahawa perjanjian tersebut terbatal kerana ia bertentangan dengan syarat nyata tanah tersebut. Perlu diingatkan bahawa pada masa yang material apabila perjanjian tersebut dimeterai iaitu pada 21 Februari 2013 dan juga pada masa pertikaian antara pihak-pihak difailkan di mahkamah, kategori kegunaan bagi tanah-tanah tersebut yang diendors dalam dokumen hakmilik keluaran ialah 'Bangunan' dengan 'Kediaman' sebagai syarat nyata. Namun begitu, sebelum perjanjian tersebut

dimeterai, pada 8 Mei 2012, permohonan yang dibuat di bawah s 204D Kanun Tanah Negara ('KTN') oleh pemilik asal tanah tersebut iaitu Kris Angsana Sdn Bhd ('Kris Angsana') untuk penyerahan, pemberian semula dan pengubahan syarat nyata daripada 'Kediaman' kepada 'Komersial' dan 'Pembangunan Bercampur' ('permohonan di bawah s 204D') telah dibenarkan tertakluk kepada pembayaran premium. Selepas pembayaran premium tersebut, Jabatan Tanah dan Galian, Kuala Lumpur telah mengeluarkan perakuan bertarikh 18 Februari 2013 yang mengakui pembayaran premium dan menyatakan bahawa permohonan di bawah s 204D telah diluluskan. Terdapat juga surat bertarikh 5 September 2013 memaklumkan Kris Angsana mengenai keputusan bertarikh 8 Mei 2012 serta kenaikan premium. Pada akhir perbicaraan, pesuruhjaya kehakiman yang bijaksana ('PK') mendapati bahawa perjanjian tersebut adalah menyalahi undang-undang atas dasar bahawa penggunaan premis tersebut melanggar syarat nyata. Oleh itu, PK menolak tuntutan Bellajade dan membenarkan tuntutan balas CME. Semasa rayuan, keputusan PK tersebut telah diubah oleh Mahkamah Rayuan ('MR') yang memutuskan yang sebaliknya. Terkilan dengan keputusan MR, CME dan Tan Sri Lim memfailkan rayuan berasingan kepada Mahkamah Persekutuan ('MP'). Mahkamah Persekutuan melalui keputusan majoriti telah membenarkan rayuan tetapi keputusan tersebut disampaikan tanpa kehadiran salah seorang hakim yang bersidang iaitu Yang Arif Zulkefli bin Ahmad Makinuddin, yang telah bersara. Atas permohonan Bellajade untuk semakan keputusan MP menurut s 78 Akta Mahkamah Kehakiman 1964 disebabkan oleh kegagalan koram, rayuan telah didengar semula oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan. Persoalan undang-undang yang perlu diputuskan oleh mahkamah ialah: (a) sama ada kelulusan oleh pihak berkuasa negeri yang diberikan di bawah s 204D KTN beroperasi sebagai kelulusan penggunaan tanah di bawah s 124 KTN ('persoalan pertama'); (b) sama ada pengubahan syarat tanah di bawah s 124 KTN berkuat kuasa selepas pengendorsan yang sama pada dokumen hakmilik keluaran tanah tersebut ('persoalan kedua'); dan (c) sama ada penyewaan untuk kegunaan tanah secara komersial yang mana berdasarkan syarat tanah tersebut adalah untuk kegunaan kediaman adalah menyalahi undang-undang dan tidak sah dengan mengambil kira keputusan MP dalam*Singma Sawmill Co Sdn Bhd v Asian Holdings (Industrialised Buildings) Sdn Bhd* [1980] 1 MLJ 21 ('kes Singma') dan *Toh Huat Khay v Lim A Chang (in his capacity as the executor of the estate of Toh Hoy Khay, deceased)* [2010] 4 MLJ 312 ('kes Toh Huat Khay') ('persoalan ketiga'). Berkenaan dengan keterangan tambahan dalam bentuk surat daripada pejabat Pengarah Tanah dan Galian, Wilayah Persekutuan bertarikh 16 November 2015 dan 16 Disember 2015 ('keterangan tambahan') berkaitan kenaikan premium yang difailkan di Mahkamah Rayuan menurut s 69 Akta Mahkamah Kehakiman 1964, Bellajade berhujah bahawa keterangan tambahan ini tidak material.

Diputuskan, membenarkan sebahagian rayuan-rayuan:

(1) Berdasarkan surat daripada pentadbir tanah bertarikh 5 September 2013, dan perakuan pengesahan kelulusan, permohonan Kris Angsana secara nyata dinyatakan telah dibuat di bawah s 204D KTN dan dalam perakuan tersebut, syarat hakmilik tanah tersebut adalah jelas dinyatakan sebagai pembangunan bercampur untuk tujuan pangsapuri dan pejabat sahaja. Oleh itu, permohonan tersebut bukan dibuat semata-mata untuk pengubahan syarat di bawah s 124(4) KTN. Seksyen 204D KTN telah digunakan kerana pembangunan ini bukan melibatkan satu bidang tanah tetapi sembilan bidang tanah, oleh itu keperluan untuk penggabungan tanah-tanah tersebut dan memandangkan sifat pembangunan tersebut, terdapat keperluan yang sama untuk membuat permohonan tersebut di bawah s 124(4). Fakta bahawa s 204D KTN hanya dinyatakan dalam alternatif dalam perakuan tersebut tidak bermakna ia tidak digunakan oleh pentadbir tanah kerana menurut s 204C KTN yang menetapkan syarat sebelum kelulusan di bawah s 204D boleh diberikan, pengubahan dalam kegunaan tanah dan sudah tentu secara implikasinya, syaratnya juga boleh dimasukkan ke dalam permohonan tersebut. Mahkamah menyebut 'implikasi' kerana kedua-dua kegunaan tanah dan syaratnya adalah termaktub di dalam s 124 KTN yang sama dan tambahan pula, s 113(a) mengenai pengubahan syarat merujuk kepada s 124(1). Berdasarkan fakta kes ini yang berbeza, mahkamah menjawab persoalan pertama secara positif kerana jelas bahawa permohonan Kris Angsana dibuat di bawah s 204D dan s 124(4) KTN (lihat perenggan 11).

(2) Mahkamah tidak bersetuju dengan perayu-perayu bahawa s 78(3) KTN yang memperuntukkan bahawa pemberian milikan tanah berkuat kuasa selepas pendaftaran dokumen hak milik yang didaftarkan adalah terpakai dalam kes ini kerana peruntukan tersebut khusus untuk pemberian milik. Memandangkan terdapat peruntukan khusus yang mengawal tarikh berkuat kuasa untuk perubahan atau pertukaran dalam kegunaan tanah dan syaratnya, iaitu s 124 KTN, maka peruntukan tersebutlah yang sepatutnya perlu dikuatkuasakan (lihat perenggan 12).

(3) Kanun Tanah Negara tidak menetapkan tarikh kuat kuasa untuk kelulusan pengubahan syarat. Sekiranya tiada peruntukan khusus tersebut, tarikh berkuat kuasa adalah apabila pengubahan yang sama telah diendorskan pada hakmilik. Ini adalah kerana: (a) telah menjadi undang-undang yang mantap bahawa di bawah sistem Torrens, daftar adalah 'segala-galanya' dan oleh itu, pengubahan kegunaan tanah hanya akan berkuat kuasa apabila ia diendors di dalam hakmilik tanah; dan (b) kelulusan pertukaran syarat adalah tidak mencukupi tanpa memenuhi keperluan mandatori yang berbangkit di bawah s 124(7). Oleh itu mahkamah menjawab persoalan kedua secara afirmatif (lihat perenggan 14).

(4) Berdasarkan pengisytiharan jelas yang dibuat oleh MP dalam kes *Singma* dan kes *Toh Huat Khay*, jawapan yang jelas untuk persoalan ketiga adalah afirmatif. Walau bagaimanapun, menjawab persoalan kedua dan persoalan ketiga secara afirmatif tidak semestinya bermaksud kemenangan undang-undang penuh bagi CME dan Tan Sri Lim. Ini adalah disebabkan oleh keanehan fakta di hadapan mahkamah yang mana tidak seperti kes *Singma*, tidak ada niat yang jelas untuk melakukan atau bahkan mengekalkan kesalahan undang-undang dalam kes ini. Pengenaan premium tambahan yang belum dijelaskan tidak seharusnya dipersalahkan sepenuhnya terhadap Bellajade kerana masa yang penting di sini ialah tarikh pelaksanaan perjanjian. Dengan kelulusan dan pematuhan penuh syarat yang dikenakan bagi pelaksanaan pertukaran kegunaan tanah, apa yang perlu dilakukan pada masa material hanyalah tindakan pentadbiran pengendorsan pertukaran tersebut ke dalam hakmilik tanah. Oleh itu, perjanjian tersebut tidak terbatal ab initio. Berdasarkan dapatan tersebut, persoalan berkenaan pengetahuan tentang ketidakesahan syarat tersebut di pihak CME adalah tidak penting ke atas isu liabilitinya untuk membayar sewa seperti yang dituntut (lihat perenggan 15–16).

(5) Hujah mengenai pengetahuan atau lebih tepatnya ketiadaan pengetahuan di pihak CME telah dibuat secara sah oleh peguam yang terpelajar terutamanya hujah mengenai kegagalan memplid pengetahuan konstruktif oleh Bellajade dan berdasarkan pengakuan oleh Bellajade mengenai ketiadaan pengetahuan. Pengetahuan tersebut tidak sepatutnya dikaitkan dengan CME untuk mengikat liabiliti di pihak mereka dan keterangan yang memihak kepada mereka ialah mereka hanya mengetahui syarat nyata kegunaan tanah tersebut apabila melakukan carian ke atas tanah tersebut pada 28 Oktober 2013 seperti yang ditunjukkan dalam dokumen rasmi Jabatan Tanah dan Galian, Kuala Lumpur (lihat perenggan 17–19).

(6) Mahkamah tidak bersetuju dengan hujah Bellajade bahawa keterangan tambahan tersebut tidak material. Hakikat bahawa telah dinyatakan dengan jelas dalam surat bertarikh 16 Disember 2015 bahawa keputusan lain yang dibuat pada 8 Mei 2012 dikekalkan pastinya bermakna keputusan untuk menaikkan premium juga dikekalkan. Oleh itu, berkuat kuasa 16 Disember 2015, pra-syarat untuk pelaksanaan pengubahan syarat telah tidak dipenuhi berdasarkan keterangan yang tidak dipertikaikan bahawa kenaikan premium tersebut tidak dibayar pada masa pertikaian ini. Oleh itu, bermula dari tarikh tersebut dan seterusnya, Bellajade tidak boleh mengandaikan bahawa pengubahan syarat tersebut masih berkuat kuasa atau berlaku dan di bawah keadaan tersebut, perjanjian tersebut pada ketika itu telah terbatal. Atas sebab yang dinyatakan di atas, Bellajade hanya berhak untuk menuntut sewa tertunggak dari Mei 2013 hingga Disember 2015 tetapi tidak sehingga

A tamat tempoh penyewaan tiga tahun seperti yang dinyatakan dalam pernyataan tuntutan (lihat perenggan 20 & 22–23)]

Cases referred to

Doshi v Yeoh Tiong Lay [1975] 1 MLJ 85, FC (refd)
B *Holman et Al' v Johnson, alias Newland* (1775) 98 ER 1120, KBD (refd)
Singma Sawmill Co Sdn Bhd v Asian Holdings (Industrialised Buildings) Sdn Bhd [1980] 1 MLJ 21, FC (refd)
Tan Sri Dato' Lim Cheng Pow v Bellajade Sdn Bhd and another appeal [2018] MLJU 1305, HC (refd)
C *Teh Bee v K Maruthamuthu* [1977] 2 MLJ 7, FC (refd)
Toh Huat Khay v Lim A Chang (in his capacity as the executor of the estate of Toh Hoy Khay, deceased) [2010] 4 MLJ 312, FC (refd)

Legislation referred to

D Contracts Act 1950 ss 24, 66
Courts of Judicature Act 1964 ss 69, 78
National Land Code ss 78(3), 113(a), 124, 124(1), (1)(a), (1)(c), (4), (7), 204C, 204D, Forms 7A, 7C

E **Appeal from**: Civil Appeal No W-02(IM)(NCVC)-976–06 of 2015 (Court of Appeal, Putrajaya)

Wong Rhen Yen (Sim Kok Yew and Mohd Khairi bin Ahmad Tarmizi with him) (KY Sim & Co) in Civil Appeal No 02(f)-135–11 of 2017 (W) for the
F *appellant.*
Guok Ngek Seong (Leong Xin Wen with him) (Guok Partnership) in Civil Appeal No 02(f)-136–11 of 2017 (W) for the appellant.
M Pathnamanathan (Michele Kaur, Tee Yee Man and Shirin Pathmanathan with him) (Sun & Michele) in Civil Appeal Nos 02(f)-135–11 of 2017 (W) and
G *02(f)-136–11 of 2017 (W) for the respondent.*

Rhodzariah Bujang FCJ:

[1] These two appeals pertain to a tenancy agreement ('the agreement') in
H respect of a block of 23 storey office building in Ampang named Plaza Palas, entered into by its owner, Bellajade Sdn Bhd ('Bellajade') and CME Group Berhad ('CME'), its tenant. CME's performance of the agreement was guaranteed by Tan Sri Dato' Lim Cheng Pow ('Tan Sri Lim'). The agreement was for a fixed period of three years commencing from the date of completion,
I that is, 20 February 2013, of a sale and purchase agreement dated 25 March 2012 between Bellajade and the previous owner of Plaza Palas, Orion Choice Sdn Bhd ('Orion Choice'), who still retained ownership of another block of buildings comprising service apartments built on the same nine parcels of land as Plaza Palas. Orion Choice obtained ownership of the said lands from one

Kris Angsana Sdn Bhd ('Kris Angsana'). This fact is mentioned in Recital A of the agreement and the date of that sale and purchase agreement was 11 June 2011. Given that Kris Angsana was then a company in liquidation, Orion Choice was cited in the agreement as the beneficial owner of the land. At that material time, as well as at the time when the dispute between the parties herein was filed in court, the category of use for the said lands stated on the land titles was 'Building' with 'Residential' as their express condition.

[2] About six months after the sale and purchase agreement with Orion Choice, that is, on 1 December 2011, Kris Angsana applied to the land administrator for surrender, re-alienation and change of the said condition from 'Residential' to 'Commercial' and 'Mixed Development'. This was followed by an application dated 2 March 2012 by Orion Choice to Kuala Lumpur City Council ('the council') for approval, which approval was granted, to amend the building plans for Plaza Palas, to use it for a commercial purpose. The said application to the land administrator was granted on 8 May 2012 but subject to payment of RM1,550,172 which is inclusive of a premium in the sum of RM1,531,179. It is expressly stated in the said letter of approval that the land use is 'Bangunan' and the express condition is '... pembangunan bercampur bagi tujuan pangsapuri dan pejabat sahaja'. Bellajade subsequently applied and was granted a Certificate for Occupation ('CFO') for Plaza Palas by the council on 27 November 2012 to use it for the purpose as stipulated on the building plan, that is commercial. The said approval incorporates the use of the other block consisting the service apartments mentioned earlier. Pursuant to a full payment of the premium on 14 February 2013, a certificate dated 18 February 2013 was issued by the Department of Land and Mines, Kuala Lumpur, acknowledging the payment and stating that Kris Angsana's application 'yang dikemukakan di bawah Seksyen 204D Kanun Tanah Negara' has been approved. That certificate is titled 'Sijil Pengesahan Kelulusan Permohonan Di Bawah Seksyen 124, 124A, 137, 142, 148, 197, 200 atau 204D, Kanun Tanah Negara 1965'. As seen from the narration of the facts above, the agreement was entered on 21 February 2013, seven days after the said payment was made, which is a day after Bellajade paid Orion Choice the balance of the purchase price amounting to RM139,250,000.

[3] Reverting back now to the agreement, the agreed rental was RM1,018,750 per month and CME paid six months rental after taking over the premises but that was all. This led to Bellajade filing a suit in the High Court against CME and Tan Sri Lim for the outstanding rentals as at 27 December 2013, starting from the month of May 2013 in the sum of RM8,401,756.85, as well as the amount of rentals for the remaining period of the tenancy. CME, on the other, filed a counterclaim for the rentals, rental deposit and utilities bills which it had paid to Bellajade on the ground, inter alia, that the agreement was void for flouting the said express condition.

A However, it is to be noted that after the service of the writ of summons and statement of claim, CME paid the rentals for June and July 2013 as evidenced by their solicitor's letter, Messrs Faizah, Lim and Associates dated 24 February 2014 (at p 78 of the common core bundle of documents) with an unkept promise, to settle the balance of the arrears on or by 30 April 2014.

B

[4] Bellajade's claim was dismissed whereas CME's counterclaim was allowed by the learned judicial commissioner after a full trial but which decision was reversed on appeal by the Court of Appeal. On 13 November 2017, the Federal Court granted leave to CME and Tan Sri Lim to appeal C against the said decision based on these three questions of law:

(a) whether an approval by the state authority given under s 204D of the National Land Code operates as an approval of land use under s 124 of the National Land Code?

D

(b) whether a change of condition of land under s 124 of the National Land Code takes effect upon endorsement of the same on the issue document of title to the land in question? and

(c) whether a tenancy for commercial use of land which is by condition for E residential use is illegal and void having regard to the decisions of the Federal Court in *Singma Sawmill Co Sdn Bhd v Asian Holdings (Industrialised Buildings) Sdn Bhd* [1980] 1 MLJ 21 and *Toh Huat Khay v Lim A Chang (in his capacity as the executor of the estate of Toh Hoy Khay, deceased)* [2010] 4 MLJ 312?

F

[5] On 12 March 2018, this court consisting a panel of five judges ('the earlier panel'), to wit, Justice Zulkefli bin Ahmad Makinuddin, President Court of Appeal ('Justice Zulkefli'), Justice Zaharah bt Ibrahim, Chief Judge of Malaya ('Justice Zaharah'), Federal Court Justices, Zainun bt Ali ('Justice G Zainun'), Azahar bin Mohamed ('Justice Azahar', as he then was) and Balia Yusof bin Haji Wahi ('Justice Balia') heard the appeals and reserved its decision. That decision was delivered on 25 September 2018 but without the presence of Justice Zulkefli, although His Lordship had prepared the grounds of judgment for the majority of the judges who allowed the appeal as His Lordship had by H then resigned, the exact date of resignation being 31 July 2018. The salient parts of the majority judgment were read out in open court by Justice Azahar whilst that of the minority written by Justice Zainun. The said judgments are reported in *Tan Sri Dato' Lim Cheng Pow v Bellajade Sdn Bhd and another appeal* [2018] MLJU 1305.

I

[6] Bellajade filed an application to review the said decision under s 78 of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964, which was allowed on 14 February 2019, on the ground of coram failure, premised on Justice Zulkefli's retirement as stated above. CME and Tan Sri Lim followed with another review application of their

own to further review the said review decision which was dismissed on 13 October 2020. Thus, these appeals were heard afresh by this court on 27 January 2021 and at the conclusion of which, the judgment was again reserved. This then is our grounds for the said judgment which we would start off by giving a more detailed description of the legal dispute troubling the parties.

LEGAL DISPUTE

[7] As can be gleaned from the leave questions granted to Bellajade, the crux of the parties' legal dispute lies with the condition of title for the said lands. It bears repeating that at the material time when the tenancy agreement was entered into, the express condition endorsed therein on the use of the land was residential. Thus, the alternative defence pleaded at para 19 of CME's defence is that the agreement was void because it described the use of the premises as 'commercial' which is against the said condition. The learned judicial commissioner made a finding that the agreement was illegal on the basis that the contemplated use of the premises contravened the said express condition, citing *Singma Sawmill Co Sdn Bhd v Asian Holdings (Industrialised Buildings) Sdn Bhd* [1980] 1 MLJ 21, as authority in support of the said finding. His Lordship also found acquiescence of the illegality alleged against CME was not proven. We pause here to mention that in *Singma*'s case, the plaintiff had rented out a portion of its land to the defendant for the express purpose, as stipulated in the tenancy agreement, of operating a factory when the category of land use was agriculture and with an express condition that it be used for the cultivation of pineapple and rubber. Coming back to the appeals before us, the learned judicial commissioner found, and the earlier panel agreed with him, that the tenancy agreement was void under s 24 of the Contracts Act 1950 ('the Contracts Act') because the consideration was illegal and Bellajade could not avail itself of s 66 of the Contracts Act as 'compensation for the advantage (if any) which had accrued to CME in its occupation of the premises on the ground that CME was unjustly enriched'. Based on the said finding the learned judicial commissioner also dismissed Bellajade's claim against Tan Sri Lim because firstly, Bellajade had participated in the illegality that had rendered the agreement void and secondly, on the application of the principle *ex turpi causa non oritur actio*.

[8] The Court of Appeal reversed the decision of the learned judicial commissioner on the grounds, firstly, that His Lordship erred in applying the ratio in *Singma*'s case as the facts in the cited case are distinguishable in that Singma had before entering into the tenancy agreement applied unsuccessfully to change the category of land use from agriculture to industrial. Furthermore, it had been issued a notice in Form 7A of the National Land Code ('the NLC') to remedy its breach of the land use and demolish the factory but which directive it did not comply with. Therefore, this court, in *Singma*'s case, held that the said breach was 'willful, if not contumacious' for the clear intention of

the appellant was to use the land on which the factory was built for an unlawful purpose. It further held that the appellant is deemed to have been aware of the illegality of the agreement when they entered it and consequently, s 66 of the Contracts Act cannot assist them. Thus, the decision of the learned judicial commissioner in *Singma*'s case that the contract was void under s 24 of the Contracts Act was therefore affirmed.

[9] The Court of Appeal however found that the facts in these appeals before us are different in that, as we had mentioned earlier, there was the application made by Kris Angsana to the land administrator, to change the use of the land to not just commercial in fact but also mixed development which had been approved vide a letter dated 8 May 2012. This approval was conditional upon payment of RM1,550,172 which amount includes the sum of RM1,531,179 being the premium for the said change which was paid on 14 February 2013. Therefore, as against the learned judicial commissioner's findings that the process of conversion had commenced, the Court of Appeal found that process had in fact been completed when the agreement was entered into. Since here it was just a change in the express condition, as opposed to category of land use, the Court of Appeal held that under s 124(4) of the NLC, the said change need not be endorsed on the land title in order for it to be effective. The Court of Appeal also considered the evidence that the council had on 27 November 2012, issued a certificate for occupation of the Plaza Palas which is further evidence of the change of land use to 'commercial' and 'mixed development' and the learned judicial commissioner erred when he held that the said certificate has no bearing on the express condition.

[10] On the counterclaim of CME which the learned judicial commissioner allowed because the agreement was one which it discovered to be void under s 66 of the Contracts Act because it was not aware of the contravention of the express condition of title, the Court of Appeal held based on *Doshi v Yeoh Tiong Lay* [1975] 1 MLJ 85, that CME had constructive knowledge of the breach of the express condition. That evidence of the said knowledge is derived from the fact that CME's solicitor, Messrs Faizah, Lim and Associates, was the very same one who had acted for Orion Choice in the sale and purchase agreement with Bellajade and the said solicitor 'could not have been ignorant' of the contravention of the express condition of land use. Thus, CME's counterclaim was dismissed.

CONSIDERATION OF THE APPEALS

[11] Since the crux of the legal dispute between the parties lies with the express condition of the land and in view of the first two leave question, Kris Angsana's application for 'Surrender, Re-alienation, Amalgamation and Conversion of Land Use' under s 204D of the NLC, and the approval thereof,

is instrumental to and crucial to our resolution of the parties' dispute herein. In this regard, the letter from the land administrator dated 5 September 2013, and the certificate confirming the approval, are relevant and what is noteworthy from both documents is the fact that the application is expressly stated to have been made under s 204D of the NLC and in the said certificate, the condition of the land titles is clearly stated to be mixed development for the purpose of apartments and office only. It is therefore, not one made solely for a change of condition under s 124(4) of the NLC, given the express citation of the said s 204D in both the application and the certificate of approval although in the certificate the said section was put in the alternative, that is, 'atau'. The reason to invoke s 204D is pretty obvious because, as stated earlier, this development is not on a single parcel of land but nine parcels of land. Hence the need for amalgamation of the same to suit the extensive development built on it and given the nature of that development there is an equal need to make that application under s 124(4). The mere fact that s 204D is only stated in the alternative in the said certificate does not mean, on the clear facts of this case that is was not invoked by the land administrator. The reason why we say so is because of, firstly, s 204C which lays out the condition before an approval under s 204D is granted and it reads as follows:

> 204C Condition for approval of surrender and re-alienation.
>
> (1) No surrender and re-alienation under this Part shall be approved by the State Authority unless the following conditions are satisfied —
>
> (a) That the portions and units of the land to be re-alienated conform in shape, area, measurements, location and *intended use* with a layout plan approved by the appropriate authority;
>
> (b) That no item of land revenue is outstanding in respect of the land;
>
> (c) That the land is not under attachment by any court;
>
> (d) that there are no registered interests in the land; and
>
> (e) that every person or body specified in sub-section (2) has consented in writing to the making of the application (Emphasis added.)

Thus, it is explicit from the words emphasised above that a change in land use and by necessary implication, even its condition can be incorporated into that application. We said 'implication' because both land use and its condition are covered by the same s 124 and furthermore, s 113(a) on the change in condition refers to s 124(1). Section 113(a) reads as follows:

> 113 The condition and restriction in interest applicable to any alienated land shall, after becoming fixed by the operation of any of the preceding provisions of this Chapter, be subject to all such changes as may result from —
>
> (a) the granting of any application by the proprietor under subsection 124(1).

Hence, when such an application is made under s 204D, the governing provisions are those provided under that part of the NLC which is titled

'Surrender and Re-alienation — Special Provisions'. Therefore, the first leave question on the peculiar facts of this case should be answered in the positive, because of the clear evidence that Kris Angsana's application to the land administrator was made both under ss 204D and 124(4). Otherwise, generally speaking, the answer to the said question would be in the negative because there would be instances when an application to surrender and re-alienate the land for the purpose of amalgamation would not involve a change in its stipulated use and condition.

THE SECOND LEAVE QUESTION

[12] Nevertheless, despite holding the above view, we could not agree with learned counsel for the appellants that s 78(3) of the NLC which provides that alienation of land takes effect upon registration of the register document of title applies in the case before us because that provision is specifically for alienation. It makes perfect sense that such a process is only effective when it is registered in the document of title, otherwise it would carry serious implications and may even be open to abuse. Since there is a specific provision governing the effective date for variation or changes in land use and its condition, which is s 124, then that should be the one which must be given effect to. For the purpose of this appeal, s 124(4) is the relevant one which is reproduced below with sub-s (1)(c):

> 124(1) The proprietor of any alienated land may apply to the State Authority under this section for —
>
> (c) the amendment of any express condition or restriction in interest endorsed on, or referred to in, the document of title thereto, or the imposition of any new express condition or restriction in interest.
>
> (4) The State Authority may approve any application under paragraph (c) of sub-section (1) either in the terms in which it was submitted or, with the consent of the applicant and any other persons or bodies whose consent thereto was required under the proviso to that sub-section, subject to such modifications as it may think fit, and shall, in either case, direct as appropriate —
>
> (a) The amendment of any condition or restriction in interest endorsed on the document of title to the land, or
>
> (b) The endorsement on that document of title of a note of the amendment of any condition or restriction which is merely referred to therein, or
>
> (c) The endorsement on that document of title of any new condition or restriction in interest.

[13] It is clear from that said provision that upon approval of the application for the said change, the state authority would direct that the subject matter of the approval be endorsed on the land title. It is to be equally emphasised that s 113(a) which we had reproduced earlier, in turn provides that the condition

and restriction in interest on the land be subject to the changes which result from the granting of any application under s 124(1).

[14] From our reading and understanding of the above provisions, the NLC does not stipulate when is the effective date for the approval of the change in condition unlike that for alienation of land as provided in s 78(3) and change in category of land use in s 124(1)(a). In the absence of such specific provision, that effective date, in our view, would be when the same is similarly endorsed on the title. We say this because, firstly it is settled law that under the Torrens system, which our land law is subject to, that the register is, to repeat the word of Ali Ag CJ (Malaya) in *Teh Bee v K Maruthamuthu* [1977] 2 MLJ 7 at p 12 thereof, 'everything' and therefore, the change of use of the land will only take effect upon its endorsement on the land title. This cited case concerns the appellant's claim as the registered land owner for vacant possession of her land which was occupied by the respondent. The respondent resisted the claim on the principal ground that the title was null and void. That was because the appellant had failed to pay the requisite fees imposed by the state authority for alienation of the land to her and the time specified under the approval for her to do so had also lapsed. Nevertheless, the Federal Court gave her the relief she prayed for on account of the registration on the land title in her name as the registered landowner as aforesaid. Secondly, as held by this court in *Toh Huat Khay v Lim A Chang (in his capacity as the executor of the estate of Toy Hoy Khay, deceased)* [2018] 4 MLJ 312, even if there was an approval by the state authority to transfer the land but *without* the consequential mandatory requirements of s 124(7) being carried out, to wit, the entry of a memorandum in Form 7C by the registrar on the register and issue document of title of the approval to strike off or delete the restriction approved, that is insufficient to legalise the transfer since the restriction is still endorsed on the land title. This cited case concerns a restriction in interest endorsed on a temporary occupation licence issued to the deceased regarding the transfer of the land, but inspite of that restriction the transfer was effected to the defendant after approval by the land administrator although there was no such entry being recorded on the land title. Thus, the Federal Court affirmed the High Court decision to set aside the transfer. This very same s 124(7) is equally applicable to an approval for change in condition in these appeals because of the clear requirement in the said provision and when it is read with sub-s (1)(c) and (4) which we had reproduced earlier. This we must do given the opening sentence of s 124(7) which we have emphasized in a reproduction of that provision below.

Section 124

(7) *Upon approval by the State Authority under this section*, the Land Administrator shall sign a memorandum in Form 7C in accordance with the direction of the State Authority and shall present the same, and on the memorial thereof being made, the Registrar shall make an entry on the register and issue documents of title to the land and shall note the date thereof and the authority therefore, and authenticate the

same under his hand and seal. (Emphasis added.)

Therefore, the second leave question should be answered in the affirmative.

THE THIRD LEAVE QUESTION

[15] The obvious answer to this question, given the clear pronouncements made by this court in the two cases cited in it, that is, *Singma*'s case and *Toh Huat Khay*'s case, is a yes but answering it and the second leave question in the affirmative does not necessarily mean a complete legal victory for CME and consequentially, Tan Sri Lim. This is because of the peculiarity of the facts now before us as unlike the land owners in the aforesaid two cited cases who did not take any official step to remove the restriction of interest on the land (in *Toh Huat Khay*'s case) and was unsuccessful in its application to change the category of land use (in *Singma*'s case), Bellajade in this case was in a completely reverse position. As stated earlier, not only was the approval granted, even Plaza Palas was given the certificate for occupation by the council and was obligated by it to pay an assessment tax on a commercial rate. It is again worth emphasising that even the stipulated premium at the time of approval was paid when the tenancy agreement was entered into. Therefore, unlike *Singma*'s case, there was no obvious intention to commit or even perpetuate the illegality. The dealing between the parties, in other words, was above board at the start. Although the learned judicial commissioner had rightly held that the granting of the certificate for occupation for the Plaza Palas by the council has no bearing on the express condition of the title but in our view that certificate adds another dimension to the sincerity of Bellajade when entering the agreement for it reinforces the official approval on the change in condition. We say that because the council being a public entity, it must be presumed to have made a diligent search of the land title's condition before issuing the said certificate. It cannot be, unless there is evidence to the contrary, that one arm of the public authority is oblivious to what the other is doing. Thus, at the time the agreement was entered, the change in condition was effectively in place though not formally endorsed on the land title yet.

[16] The imposition of further premium afterwards which were not settled yet at the material time of the dispute should not be completely held against Bellajade for the crucial time here is the execution date of the agreement. With the approval and full satisfaction of the condition imposed to effect the change of land use, we would agree with Bellajade that what was left to be done at that material time was the administrative act of endorsing the change on the land title. Thus, the agreement was not void ab initio. In the face of this finding, we are of the view that the question of knowledge of the alleged illegality of the said condition on the part of CME is immaterial to the issue of its liability to pay the rentals as claimed. However, for the sake of argument, we would address this point now.

[17] Learned counsel for the appellants submitted, citing *Holman et Al' v Johnson, alias Newland* (1775) 98 ER 1120, and of course *Singma*'s case, in view of the illegality upon which the cause of action was based, the court should not lend its hand to Bellajade to allow its claim. In response, learned counsel for the appellants submitted that CME had no notice of the illegality at that material time and therefore the learned judicial commissioner had rightly ordered restitution in its favour. He said this absence of knowledge was conceded to by learned counsel for Bellajade at the trial as can be seen from the notes of proceeding reproduced at Tab 16 of the Further Common Core Bundle of Documents at p 251 thereof. The said notes of proceeding reads as follows:

> Mah: So we have a situation where the CME has entered into a Tenancy Agreement. It's appears not to have any notice of the fact the condition of land use right, is residential, and it appears as though it is a contravention of an express condition of title. They entered into the Tenancy and it appears that they only subsequently found out.
>
> Plf: Yes.
>
> Mah: I understand that, Faizal, Lim & Associates did they also act for CME?
>
> Plf: For a short while in February.
>
> Mah: In fact they are not obligated from informing CME of, in fact the obligation of confidentiality would prohibit them from informing another client of matters relating to another client, right?
>
> Plf: Yes.
>
> Mah: So there's no question at all. *It appears as there is no question at all that at least there's no evidence before me right, that can lead me to the conclusion that CME knew at the time which is signed the Tenancy Agreement that there was an express condition of title that would contravene the stated aim of the Tenancy Agreement.*
>
> Plf: *Yes My Lord*. (Emphasis added.)

[18] The finding of constructive knowledge by the Court of Appeal (which was never pleaded by Bellajade) based on the two letters dated 14 February 2013 and 19 February 2013 written by Messrs. Faizah, Lim & Associates then acting for Orion Choice was erroneous, submitted learned counsel further, because these letters were never adduced at the trial and only brought to the attention of the Court of Appeal in an affidavit of its counsel and filed as an additional appeal record after parties were asked to make further submissions by the said court.

[19] With respect to the Court of Appeal, we are of the view that the above point on knowledge or rather the lack thereof, on the part of CME are validly made by learned counsel, especially the non-pleading point and in the face of the said admission as quoted above. As for the point on the additional evidence, that would be addressed subsequently in our judgment. Therefore, again with

respect to the Court of Appeal, the said knowledge should not have been imputed on CME to fasten liability on their part and the evidence which stands in their favour is that it only found out about the express condition on the land use when it conducted a search on the land on 28 October 2013 as shown in the official documents of the Department of Land and Mines, Kuala Lumpur appearing at pp 50–87 at Tab 4 of the Further Common Core Bundle of Document.

INCREASE IN PREMIUM

[20] We would turn next to the issue of the additional evidence which relates to the increase in premium. As mentioned earlier, at the hearing in the Court of Appeal, two letters from office of the Director of Land and Mines, Federal Territory dated 16 November 2015 and 16 December 2015 addressed to Bellajade's solicitor were filed by way of annexures to the affidavit of Koek Tiang Kung (a Director of Bellajade) affirmed on 19 November 2015 and 7 January 2016, respectively. These are additional evidence filed pursuant to s 69 of Courts of Judicature Act 1964 which allows reception of evidence which occurred post the High Court decision under the court's discretion. As pointed out by Bellajade's counsel in his submission before us, the said evidence was received by the court without objection by their legal opponents except to say that the evidence was not material, which contention, with respect we could not agree with. Given the importance of these two letters to our ultimate decision in this appeal, they would be reproduced in full below and the emphasis is all ours.

Letter dated 16 November 2015

PTG/WP.6/8008/2011(42)
4 Safar 1437H
16 November 2015

Tetuan Swan & Partners
Peguam bela & Peguam cara
Pusat Dagangan Phileo Damansara 1
Blok E 3A-10
No. 9, Jalan 16/11
46350 Petaling Jaya

Tuan,

PERKARA: (I) **PERMOHONAN UNTUK MENGURANGKAN PREMIUM TAMBAHAN TANAH**

(II) **PERMOHONAN MELANJUTKAN TEMPOH MASA BAYARAN PREMIUM TAMBAHAN TANAH SEMENTARA MENUNGGU KEPUTUSAN RAYUAN**

HARTANAH: (1) GM 3 LOT 50, (2) GM LOT 51, (3) GM 37 LOT 52, (4) GM 2045 LOT 45, (5) GM 2402 LOT 90, (6) GM 2404 LOT 88, (7) GRN 539 LOT 57, (8) GRN 540 LOT 58, DAN (9) GRN 29727 LOT 92, KESEMUANYA DALAM SEKSYEN 88, BANDAR KUALA LUMPUR WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN

TUAN TANAH: BELLAJADE SDN BHD

Dengan segala hormatnya saya diarah merujuk perkara tersebut di atas. Komunikasi antara Encik Ng dan saya pada 16 November 2015 adalah berkaitan.

2. Sukacita disahkan perkara-perkara yang berikut:

i) **Jawatankuasa Kerja Tanah Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur (JKKT WPKL) telah meluluskan dalam mesyuarat pada 8 Mei 2012 permohonan serahbalik dan berimilik semula tanah bagi kegunaan perniagaan dan pembangunan bercampur (*mixed development*);**

ii) **Surat Kelulusan berserta Borang 5A mengikut nilaian tahun 2004 telah dikeluarkan pada 9 Mei 2012 dan pemilik tanah kemudiannya pada 14 Februari 2013 menjelaskan bayaran premium berjumlah RM1,531,179.00;**

iii) **JKKT WPKL pada 5 September 2013 telah memutuskan kadar premium yang telah dikenakan disemak semula mengikut kadar semasa dan Borang 5A baharu telah dikeluarkan meminta pemilik tanah menjelaskan bayaran premium tambahan berjumlah RM3,810,143.10;**

iv) Pejabat ini ada menerima permohonan pengecualian bayaran premium ini daripada pihak pemilik tanah; dan

v) Pejabat ini kemudiannya pada 10 September 2015 menerima permohonan pihak Tuan bagi memanjangkan segala keputusan dan kelulusan berkenaan tanah-tanah yang dimaksudkan kepada Bellajade Sdn Bhd selaku pemilik tanah yang baharu.

vi) **Memandangkan permohonan tersebut di atas ini perlu melalui kelulusan JKKT WPKL terlebih dahulu, sukacita Pejabat ini memohon sedikit masa lagi bagi memprosesnya. Pejabat ini akan berhubung dengan pihak Tuan sejurus keputusan diterima nanti. Segala kerjasama pihak Tuan dalam perkara ini amatlah dihargai dan didahului dengan ucapan terima kasih jua.**

Sekian.

"BERKHIDMAT UNTUK NEGARA"

Saya yang menurut perintah,

t.t

(AMERUL FAZRIN BIN AMER JALALUDIN)
b.p. Pengarah Tanah dan Galian
Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur

Letter dated 16 December 2015

PTG/WP.6/8008/2011
16 Disember 2015

[SURAT BERDAFTAR/DENGAN TANGAN]

Tetuan Swan & Partners
Peguam bela & Peguam cara
Pusat Dagangan Phileo Damansara 1,
Blok E 3A-10,
No. 9, Jalan 16/11,
46350 Petaling Jaya.

Tuan,

Rayuan Pemanjangan kelulusan terdahulu bagi permohonan Untuk Menyerahbalik dan Bermilik Bermula Tanah di Bawah Seksyen 204D Kanun Tanah Negara GM 35 Lot 50, GM 36 Lot 51, GM

37 Lot 52, GM 2045 Lot 45, GM 2402 Lot 90, GM 2404 Lot 88, GRN 539 Lot 57, GRN 540 Lot 58 dan GRN 29727 Lot 92, Seksyen 88, Bandar Kuala Lumpur Daripada Pemilik Tanah Asal, Kris Angsana Sdn Bhd Kepada Pemilik Tanah Baru, Bellajade Sdn Bhd.

Dengan segala hormatnya saya diarah merujuk kepada permohonan tuan mengenai perkara tersebut di atas.

2. **Adalah dimaklumkan bahawa Jawatankuasa Kerta Tanah Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur yang bermesyuarat pada 10 Disember 2015 telah dipertimbangkan permohonan tuan dan bersetuju menetapkan seperti berikut:-**

2.1 Dipanjangkan keputusan mesyuarat Jawatankuasa Kerja Tanah Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur Bilk e 635/2012 pada 8 Mei 2012 melalui Kertas Bil. 6/1238/634/2012 yang diluluskan kepada Kris Angsana Sdn Bhd kepada Bellajade Sdn Bhd sebagai pemilik tanah yang baharu.

2.2 **Dikekalkan lain-lain keputusan yang telah ditetapkan di dalam Mesyuarat Jawatankuasa Kerja Tanah Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur Bil. 635/2012 pada 8 Mei 2012 melalui Kertas Bil. 6/1238/634/2012.**

Sekian, terima kasih.

'BERKHIDMAT UNTUK NEGARA'

Saya yang menurut perintah,

t.t
(NORLIANA BINTI MOHD MOKHTAR)
b.p Pentadbir Tanah
Wilayah Persekutuan
Kuala Lumpur

[21] Very obvious from para 2.2 of the letter dated 16 December 2015 is the reiteration that all decisions made in the official meeting of the department on 8 May 2012 are being maintained. The aforesaid decisions made on 8 May 2012 were conveyed to Kris Angsana vide the Department's letter dated 5 September 2013 and again given its similar importance to our resolution of the dispute of the parties, we would also reproduce the same below with our added emphasis.

Letter dated 5 September 2013

PTG/WP.6/8008/201 (30)
29 Syawal, 1434H
5 September, 2013

[SURAT BERDAFTAR/DENGAN TANGAN]

Tetuan Kris Angsana Sdn Bhd.,
No. 1128, 11th Floor
Block A, Damansara Intan,
No. 1, Jalan SS 20/27
47400 Petaling Jaya.

Tuan,

Permohonan untuk Menyerahbalik Kesemua Bahagian Tanah dan Berimilik Semula Tanah bagi Hakmilik GM 35 Lot 50, GM 36 Lot 51, GM 37 Lot 52, GM 2045 Lot 45, GM 2402 Lot 90, GM 2404 Lot 88, GRN 539 Lot 57, GRN 540 Lot 58 dan GRN 29727 Lot 92, Seksyen 88, Bandar Kuala Lumpur di Bawah Seksyen 204D Kanun Tanah Negara

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Dengan segala hormatnya saya diarah merujuk kepada permohonan tuan bertarikh 1 Disember 2011 mengenai perkara tersebut di atas dan memaklumkan bahawa **Jawatankuasa Kerja Tanah Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur yang bermesyuarat pada 8 Mei 2012 telah mempertimbangkan permohonan tuan dan bersetuju menetapkan seperti berikut:-**

1.1 **Diluluskan permohonan untuk menyerahbalik kesemua bahagian tanah GM 35 Lot 50, GM 36 Lot 51, GM 37 Lot 52, GM 2045 Lot 45, GM 2402 Lot 90, GM 2404 Lot 88, GRN 539 Lot 57, GRN 540 Lot 58 dan GRN 29727 Lot 92, Seksyen 88, Bandar Kuala Lumpur di bawah Seksyen 204D Kanun Tanah Negara dan tanah tersebut menjadi tanah Kerajaan.**

1.2 **Setelah tindakan di perenggan 1.1 di atas disempurnakan, diluluskan permohonan daripada tuan untuk memiliki tanah Kerajaan di bawah Seksyen 79 Kanun Tanah Negara bagi kawasan-kawasan sebagaimana yang ditunjukkan di atas Pelan Pra-Hitungan No. 4/2002/U3 di bawah Seksyen 79 Kanun Tanah Negara dengan dikenakan syarat-syarat serta bayaran seperti berikut:**

Kawasan berkeliling Warna Biru Untuk Pembangunan Bercampur

Jenis Suratan Hakmilik	:	Hakmilik Pejabat Tanah
Mukim	:	Bandar Kuala Lumpur
Taraf Pemilikan	:	Selama-lamanya
Premium	:	Tanah Kerajaan berasal dari tanah milik. RM750,00 s.m.p
Cukai Tahunan	:	RM255 s.m.p tertakluk kepada minimum RM106.00 per hakmilik (kadar pembangunan bercampur bagi tanah bandar)
Jenis Penggunaan Tanah	:	**Bangunan**
Syarat Nyata	:	**Tanah ini hendaklah digunakan untuk pembangunan bercampur bagi tujuan pangsapuri dan pejabat sahaja.**
Sekatan Kepentingan	:	-

2. Berikutan dengan keputusan-keputusan di atas, bayaran yang perlu dijelaskan adalah seperti berikut:

i)	Premium	:	**RM5, 341, 322.10**
ii)	Cukai Tahun Pertama	:	**RM 18, 873.00**
iii)	Penyediaan dan Pendaftaran bagi satu (1) Pasang hakmilik RM120.00 sepasang Bagi hakmilik pertama RM70.00 sepasang hakmilik berikutnya	:	**RM 120.00**
	Jumlah	:	**RM5,360,315.00**

(RM: Lima Juta Tiga Ratus Enam Puluh Ribu Tiga Ratus Lima Belas Sahaja)

3. **Oleh yang demikian, jika dipersetujui tuan dikehendaki mengemukakan bayaran-bayaran yang dikenakan berjumlah RM5,360,315.00 sebagaimana Borang 5A berkembar dalam tempoh tiga (3) bulan dari tarikh surat ini disampaikan. Tuan adalah diingatkan bahawa mengikut peruntukan 15 Kaedah-Kaedah Tanah Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur 1995, sekiranya bayaran tidak dijelaskan dalam tempoh yang ditetapkan, kelulusan permohonan ini akan terbatal dengan sendirinya.** Disamping itu, tuan juga dikehendaki mengemukakan salinan resit cukai tanah tahun semasa bagi tanah berkenaan untuk tindakan Jabatan ini selanjutnya.

4. Segala pembayaran hendaklah dibuat melalui Wang Tunai, Wang Pos, Kiriman Wang Pos atau Bank Draf atas nama Pentadbir Tanah Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur bagi membolehkan tindakan susulan dapat diambil oleh Jabatan ini dengan seberapa segera.

Sekian, terima kasih.

'BERKHIDMAT UNTUK NEGARA'

Saya yang menurut perintah,

t.t
{SUZAINI BIN AHMAD}
b.p Pentadbir Tanah,
Wilayah Persekutuan,
Kuala Lumpur.

(Emphasis added.)

[22] The fact that it is clearly stated in the letter dated 16 December 2015 that the other decisions made on 8 May 2012 are maintained, that surely means that the decision to increase the premium was also maintained. With respect to learned counsel for Bellajade, it cannot be that just because that letter dated 16 December 2015 does not mention the letter dated 5 September 2013 on the increase in premium, it therefore means 'by necessary implication that the increase in premium stated in the letter of 5/9/2013 was dropped or abandoned', because of and we reiterate, the specific reference to maintaining the decisions made in the meeting of the working committee on the 8 May 2012 where the decision to increase the premium was made.

[23] Learned counsel for Bellajade submitted that this letter dated 16 December 2015 is a nullity and that the state authority has no power under the National Land Code to subsequently vary, review, increase or impose a higher premium. With respect to learned counsel, on the facts and evidence before the court and without a proper legal action taken to quash the said decision it is simply not open for us to agree with him that it is so. Therefore,

with effect from the date of the earlier mentioned letter dated 16 December 2015 and the undisputed evidence that the increase in premium was not paid at the material time of this dispute, the pre-requisite to effect the change in condition was not met. Thus, from the said date onwards, Bellajade could not presupposed that the said change in condition is still effective or in place and under the said circumstances, the agreement had by then, been rendered void. In conclusion, and for the reason stated above Bellajade is therefore, only entitled to claim the outstanding rentals from May 2013 until December 2015 but not until the end of the three years tenancy period as it prayed in the statement of claim. In other words, what is allowed is the outstanding rental of RM8,401,756.85 as at 27 December 2013 (but minus the rentals for June and July 2013 which have been paid) and the rentals from January 2014 until December 2015, though it is only for half of that month of December and interests as prayed in para 10(c) and (d) of the statement of claim.

[24] Given that the appeals of CME and Tan Sri Dato' Lim Cheng Pow, are only allowed in part, parties are ordered to bear their own cost in these appeals.

Appeals allowed in part.

Reported by Dzulqarnain Ab Fatar